

1986

# The Republican Party and Civil Rights, 1877-1976

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The Republican Party and Civil Rights, 1877-1976

(TITLE)

BY

Gordon E. Sparks

**THESIS**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF

**Master of Arts**

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY  
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

**1986**

YEAR

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My personal thanks go out to the important people who made this study possible. To my parents, Robert and Juanita, whose drive and influence I could have not done without. To Dr. Raymond Koch, who forced me to question my political values in a healthy way. Special regards must go to Dr. Jimmie Franklin. Without his help I could not have gotten started on the right track. Finally, to my friends and teachers in the Eastern Illinois History Department, their comradeship and guidance were invaluable to me.

July 7, 1986  
Gordon E. Sparks

"We do not pledge ourselves to go further with the  
Republicans than the Republicans will go with us."

A black abolitionist

"If I'm gonna get unemployed, I'd rather the Democrats  
be in."

A black voter

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## ABSTRACT

There have been many works written on both the Republican and the Democratic parties. Many works have also described the problem of civil rights and the historical difficulties blacks have had in an attempt to fit in politically. These works, however, have left out one major aspect of this process. Relationships of blacks to the political parties themselves must be studied to understand one aspect of their continuous struggle for civil rights in America.

It is time that an overview be done on how the political parties have dealt with the civil rights problem throughout their histories. The Republican party had its roots buried in its support for civil rights; however, the percentage of black voters for Republican candidates is extremely low. It is the purpose of this thesis to try to show why blacks shifted from the Republicans to the Democrats. The history of the Republican party and black civil rights is a very broad topic.

This topic is a very complex one. Little specific research is available on the relationship between black Americans and the Republican party. Individual black attitudes and party policy can be discussed, however, through the use of numerous works and articles, many of which are secondary. This will attempt to show the

importance of Republican party policy and its connection with civil rights.

The background of these policies must be briefly noted before any modern Republican attitudes on civil rights can be fully explained. A short summary of the pre-Reconstruction period of Republican civil rights action is necessary to demonstrate the party's first set of goals. These early roots have had an important impact on the civil rights struggle which has taken place since 1954.

The major emphasis of this study describes civil rights actions under Republican presidents. Legislation occurring under these presidents continues to influence black civil rights today. Black reaction against limiting legislation is also a factor in understanding the attitude of blacks toward the federal government. Republican presidents have found themselves in difficult positions because of the need to maintain national unity while at the same time juggling civil rights, economics, and support from their own perceived constituencies.

Republican attitudes on civil rights have had a great impact on the black community, but the nature of Republican policy on civil rights makes it unlikely that blacks will swing toward the party in the near future. The purpose of this thesis is to survey the historical and political reasons which have changed the focus of Republican policy through the years.



## CHAPTER I

### THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND BLACKS IN POST-RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA

The question over slavery became an important consideration in the forging of a new national political party in the early 1850's. The Republican party developed in 1854 by bringing together those who opposed the extension of slavery into the territories. The party integrated northern ideas about the evils of slavery. Many northerners believed that slavery "connoted not so much a moral evil as a distinct way of life which endangered their own."<sup>1</sup>

When certain Republicans defended the rights of blacks, they often found themselves the subject of ridicule. The Democrats labeled the Republicans as the "Nigger Party." Such open attacks on the party led some Republican spokesmen to insist "that they, and not the Democrats, were the real 'white man's party' and they often vehemently denied any intention of giving legal or social equality to free Negroes."<sup>2</sup> This view, however, was not held by all Republicans. Two examples of Republican support for civil rights can be found in the work of Senators Salmon P. Chase (R.-Ohio) and Charles Sumner, (R.-Massachusetts).

Chase and Sumner expressed strong views over the extension of slavery into the territories. They thought that the birth of a new political party presented hope that stronger opposition to slavery could be raised. Both

believed that a conspiracy of pro-slavery advocates existed in the Senate. Indeed, southerners had gained control of the Democratic party during the 1840's and this segment of the Congress had assured victory for the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854. This act, hated by these so-called "Radical" Republican senators because of their civil rights ideals, stated that the settlers must decide on the issue of slavery in these two new territories. The act referred to this as "popular sovereignty." Although the bill passed, Sumner announced that it had opened the door toward the elimination of slavery. "It put freedom and slavery face to face," he said, "and bids them grapple."<sup>3</sup>

Acting in a concerted effort with the Know-Nothing party, which had been formed in reaction to U.S. immigration policies in the early 1850's, the Republicans had made significant national gains by 1856. Salmon Chase became Governor of Ohio, and began to campaign for the Presidential nomination. The Republicans, however, overlooked him by nominating John C. Fremont. Fremont, a former Democrat, held an impressive record as an explorer in the west. James Buchanan won the election easily, yet the Republicans demonstrated their potential strength for future elections. The party, born upon the anti-slavery issue, became a truly national party after Lincoln's election and the advent of the Civil War.

In the Lincoln-Douglas debates, Lincoln proclaimed that the statement in the Declaration of Independence that

"all men are created equal" also applied to blacks. One Republican from Michigan stated that "they Sir, are naturally entitled to all the rights which you and I, as individuals of the white race, can claim."<sup>4</sup> Other Republicans found a distinction between natural rights and civil rights for blacks. They would never agree that blacks should gain the right to vote. Colonization was one venture some Republicans accepted as a cure for racial problems. Many in the party believed it unlikely that blacks could ever achieve any form of political or social equality within the United States. Lincoln viewed colonization as one way the racial problem might be eliminated, but he did not implement any special program for the resettlement of blacks while president.

The Reconstruction period brought certain reforms for blacks. Enfranchisement was one. The Republican Congress extended the Freedman's Bureau in 1866. The Bureau successfully aided the transition from slavery to freedom by giving land and supplies to blacks and arbitrating in labor relations problems. Blacks, however, did not gain citizenship until the passage of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and its integration into the Fourteenth Amendment. The Reconstruction Act of 1867 "appeared to offer an alternative to drastic white disenfranchisement or prolonged military occupation of the South."<sup>5</sup> It permitted the Republicans to gain the majority of

the southern vote by excluding some whites who participated in the rebellion. This gave black voters a majority in most of the states from the deep South.

The Fifteenth Amendment brought about a dramatic change in the political status of the freed man. Passed in March, 1870, it prohibited any state to deny voting rights to any male citizen on the basis of race. It gave blacks suffrage in the northern and border states as well as in the South. The tactics used in the South to evade this measure were not anticipated when the framers called it "the completion and guaranty of emancipation."<sup>6</sup>

Ku Klux Klan terrorist activities forced further enforcement legislation in 1870 and 1871. These measures authorized the use of the military by the president, but this failed to control the problem entirely. The South learned to use property and literary distinctions, poll taxes, and further terrorism through white leagues and other organizations to limit black voting privileges. The final Republican party effort on the national level, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which included a desegregation provision, failed in 1883 when it was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

The period of Reconstruction which brought Republican reforms emerged from many factors. Historians still continue to debate the reasons for those changes as they search for a balanced view of Reconstruction. There were many causes. Economic factors were important, but the

struggle of some idealistic Republicans for civil rights and the political motivation for creating a southern black Republican constituency outweighs this element. The Republican Reconstruction policy in the South maintained strong black support for the party. Black political status in the party increased greatly as new employment opportunities became available. black Republicans went to the Senate and House of Representatives, courts, state departments of education and ambassadorial posts. They also served as aldermen, and judges while occupying some positions of power throughout the South and the North.

The Republicans, however, did not have purely philanthropic reasons for helping the blacks. Black historian, Hanes Walton, stated that black enfranchisement "clearly appeared a promising means of party aggrandisement; it became essential to the perpetuation of their power."<sup>7</sup> One black minister noted that although the Republicans had helped the cause, "they were doing themselves good at the same time."<sup>8</sup> The effectiveness of Radical Reconstruction extended new hope for civil rights reform in the South, but it ended before more changes could be accomplished.

The Liberal Republican movement of the 1872 Presidential election foreshadowed the end of Radical Reconstruction in the South. The platform which the Liberals adopted, contained pledges to remove government troops from the region, and it pledged opposition to "any

reopening of the questions settled by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution. We demand the immediate and absolute removal of all disabilities imposed on account of the rebellion." <sup>9</sup>

The election of Rutherford B. Hayes in the disputed contest of 1876 ended Federal protection of black civil rights in the South. The "Compromise of 1877," as it came to be known, was not publicly disclosed, and very few discovered what actually occurred during the secret proceedings. Hayes believed he needed the compromise to avert another civil war. He remarked that he knew of "fifteen states in which Democratic forces composed largely of war veterans were organized and prepared to move on Washington to compel the inauguration of Tilden." <sup>10</sup>

In 1876, Republican problems included scandals in the Grant administration and a nationwide depression. In order for Hayes to receive a majority of electoral votes in the election, he needed nineteen. This would make 185 votes for Hayes and 184 for Tilden.<sup>11</sup> Democrats in Congress, however, turned against Tilden when they resolved the vote. Tilden was committed to ending Radical Reconstruction. Placing him in the White House could have possibly gained this goal more easily. It was true that Hayes also offered to end Radical Reconstruction in return for Democratic votes, but he pledged even more concessions. Hayes agreed that one southern Democrat would join his cabinet. The railroad lobby convinced southern

congressmen that the election of Hayes would allow the completion of a railroad from Texas to California. Hayes' supporters assured the Democrats that he would remove the Reconstruction troops, thus causing the collapse of the Republican governments in Louisiana and South Carolina. A bipartisan electoral commission of fifteen men voted eight to seven that they would accept the tallies favoring Hayes. Meetings between both Hayes' supporters and Southern Democrats took place. Hayes then announced recognition for the new non-Reconstruction government in Louisiana, in return for pledges of respect for civil rights. Congress declared Hayes President on March 2, 1877. In his inaugural address Hayes announced the troop withdrawal from the South. This policy, however, did not originate with the Hayes administration. Grant had long before promised to recall the troops but did not accomplish this task. Reconstruction governments had slowly toppled in the South over the years since their installation. Radical Reconstruction policy had formed five military districts under an occupation army. The voting changes created 700,000 new black voters and disfranchised 627,000 white voters. Six governors and thousands of lower-level officials were removed from office.<sup>12</sup>

Hayes did not remove all the troops from the South, just those that continued to protect the remaining Radical governments. This action ended the military role of defending civil rights until the school desegregation

crisis of 1957 in Little Rock, Arkansas. Hayes believed that he had helped the blacks when he removed the troops. He noted that "the majority of the people of the South -- the white people of the South -- have no desire to invade the rights of the colored people."<sup>13</sup> Hayes tried to show deep concern for the plight of the blacks in the South. Just after the election, when he believed he had lost, he commented that "the result will be that the Southern people will practically treat the constitutional amendments as nullities and then the colored man's fate will be worse than when he was in slavery."<sup>14</sup>

Hayes' intentions were good. During the withdrawal of the troops, he stipulated that illegal activities against blacks must be punished, but this request implied that the punishment must come from the state level. Hayes' concern for holding the country together outweighed the results of troop withdrawal in the South. In a tour of the South shortly after the election, Hayes announced that "I tried to impress the people with the importance of harmony between the different sections, states, classes and races." Hayes "hoped for his colored friends that their future would be even brighter, and that they would always remember that to command respect men must have the virtues to deserve respect."<sup>15</sup>

During Hayes' administration, he opposed attempts at weakening civil rights legislation. He vetoed eight anti-civil rights bills and succeeded in bringing some



stability between northern and southern sectionalism.<sup>16</sup>

Hayes' policy of troop withdrawal, however, abandoned the southern black in the process. Hayes left the South alone to work out its own racial problems without help from the federal government. Party reconciliation began to weaken by the Fall of 1877 when Democrats in the House of Representatives failed to support Republican measures. Hayes retaliated by refusing to support the southern railroad subsidy. Hayes never understood the unpopularity of his southern policy. He believed that the South would become solidly Republican over the next ten years. The question of race, he conjectured, was a dead issue. In the 1878 elections, the failure of the southern policy became evident. Southern Republican support disappeared. The Republicans lost six Representatives and one Senator to Democrats. Of the 294 southern counties that had voted in 1876, 125 voted Republican. In 1878 only 62 of these counties voted Republican.<sup>17</sup> The President now accepted the defeat of his southern policy, and reluctantly admitted that "the experiment was a failure."<sup>18</sup> In the South, many acts of violence occurred during the election to prevent blacks from voting. The federal government did not interfere with this disfranchisement.

The policy of leaving the troops in the South, however, also had its own drawbacks. Both factions which fought over this issue believed that only their policy

could work and that compromise would produce failure.

Historian, C. Vann Woodward believed that in abandoning Radical Reconstruction, Hayes gave up on "an unfair test of the democratic faith as well as an unfair test of the Negro's capacity for self-government." Hayes' failure to support his party's platform in regard to civil rights came from a desire to return to "normal politics and away from an outmoded policy for which he had no sympathy."

Historian, Peter Camejo has noted that the troops stationed in the southern states had been little more than token forces anyway. The period of the failure of Radical Reconstruction became a victory of counter-revolutionary forces. Radical Reconstruction came into being, Camejo argued, because of the need of the industrial capitalists to consolidate political control.<sup>21</sup> Once they gained this control, the southern policy of support for black civil rights ended.

Blacks in the South now found themselves deserted by the Republicans and left to exploitation and terrorism. Hayes' compromise ended the enforcement of civil rights in the South by the federal government for 80 years. The last Republican governments to stand in Louisiana and South Carolina fell. Black reaction to the policy was justifiably negative. Wendell Phillips, former president of the Anti-Slavery Society, told blacks "that in view of what had happened, he could not blame them for leaving Republican ranks." James Redpath, an abolitionist and

correspondent for the New York Tribune, distributed a letter urging blacks to join the Democratic party. While these leaders attacked the southern policy, Hayes attempted to preserve black support for the party by giving them political patronage. Historian, Vincent DeSantis, noted that "this notorious device maintained the fiction of Republican recognition of the Negro voters and also served to muzzle the protests of their leaders." <sup>23</sup>

One of the most prolific black leaders, Frederick Douglass, was an excellent example of a black Republican who reacted to the changes which occurred in the South. He, however, did not attack the Republican party as harshly as did most blacks. Douglass became involved with the party almost at its inception, and remained active in it throughout his life. His surprising loyalty came during a period of time in which the Republicans appeared to give up on protecting black civil rights. Douglass' career as a black leader in the late nineteenth century presented an important picture of the early civil rights movements, for he was the "moral leader and spiritual prophet of his race."<sup>24</sup> Douglass' dedication as a Republican had historical roots in his attitude on democracy and life. He was interested in an ideal society --"one that he believed could exist in America." America's shift toward more materialistic goals paralleled the Republican party in its shift away from civil rights objectives. The party

had begun to abandon blacks well before 1900. The first attempt came when President Hayes withdrew troops from the South. More would follow. Douglass stood by the Republican party and rarely spoke out against it. In the cases where some whites failed to support black candidates, Douglass refused to counsel blacks not to support white candidates. He contended that "the Republican party is the ship and else the sea." Douglass identified the party as "the sheet anchor of the colored man's political hopes and the ark of his safety."<sup>26</sup> Whenever his party was criticized, he never failed to defend it.

Douglass received political regard for his party allegiance. President Rutherford B. Hayes named Douglass the U.S. Marshall of the District of Columbia. Many whites reacted against this appointment. Douglass had taken a more conciliatory view of Hayes' compromise with the South than did other blacks but he added that "the results of this policy were no less ruinous and damning because of the good intention of President Hayes."<sup>27</sup> Douglass went against the nomination of James A. Garfield for President in 1880. He believed that Garfield "did not have the moral make up or sufficient backbone to be president."<sup>28</sup> However, under Garfield's administration, Douglass became a consultant on black affairs, and Recorder of Deeds. Douglass praised Garfield's work after his assassination.

Many of the new President's policies appeared to attack the civil rights cause. Douglass claimed that Chester A. Arthur "did nothing to correct the errors of President Hayes or to arrest the decline and fall of the Republican party." Douglass believed that Arthur's "self-indulgence, indifference and neglect of opportunity, allowed the country to drift."<sup>29</sup> Douglass took almost the opposite opinion of Benjamin Harrison. After his nomination in 1888, it appeared as though Harrison would stand upon his party's platform for civil rights. Harrison, however, did not live up to Douglass' expectations. In 1889 he named Douglass as the Foreign Minister to Haiti. Harrison had worked with a Republican Congress, but a Federal Election Bill, designed to give blacks stronger voting rights failed. Eight Republican Senators contributed to its defeat.

Two southern plans for disfranchisement originated with the failure of these two bills. The first, brute force, had shown success far earlier. The second measure, the poll tax, provided a literacy test and property qualifications for black voters. It became a part of the Mississippi Constitution in 1890. Other southern states adopted some or all of these methods to prevent blacks from voting. Douglass, however, refused to attack Harrison for the failure of the civil rights bills. He believed that Harrison was not to blame if Republicans in Congress refused to support these measures.

Douglass continued to support the Republican presidents despite civil rights failures because of his devotion to the party and his political appointments. In 1884, Chester A. Arthur decided to form a coalition with Democrats who had broken away from the party in Virginia, after a controversy over public debts. Arthur believed that the Republican party could be strengthened in the South by giving southern Democrats patronage. He gave 200 Treasury Department posts, and 1700 Post Office positions to southerners.<sup>30</sup> Arthur did not consult his black advisors on this decision, and he appointed some of them to higher positions in order to limit their criticism of his actions. P.B.S. Pinchback became Surveyor of the Port of New Orleans. Blanche K. Bruce became an Assistant United States Commissioner General. Douglass warned blacks "not to despair, because the Republican party was still in power."<sup>31</sup>

The reason for Douglass' servitude to the Republican party grew from his personal gains from the party. He felt an allegiance, both to the Presidents who awarded him with a position, and to the party for making it possible. Some blacks hoped to convince Douglass that the Republican party no longer helped the cause of civil rights. A former black Republican, George T. Downing, complained that "the Republican party ... has come far short of its duty in the matter."<sup>32</sup> Downing recommended that blacks become Democrats, but the Democratic party showed little

indication that it could change positively for the good of civil rights. Blacks remained loyal to the Republican party, yet they became more cautious. Some blacks did bolt the party. Bishop Henry M. Turner had helped organize the Republican party in Georgia, but he and Downing "could no longer live with the course that their party was pursuing."<sup>33</sup>

In 1885, Grover Cleveland began to change the image some blacks had of the Democratic party. He appointed many blacks to office, many of them Republicans. Douglass disagreed that the Democratic party would ever increase civil rights enforcement. Others doubted that any political parties which then existed had demonstrated any civil rights progress. Under the guidance of T. Thomas Fortune, an Afro-American League developed in 1884. By 1887 the League had become a national organization. In Fortune's address at the first meeting, he stated that "I have served the Republican party, the Prohibitionist party and the Democratic party and I speak with the wisdom of experience when I declare that none of them care a fig for the Afro-American further than it can use him."<sup>34</sup>

By 1893 the League dissolved due to lack of support, money, and the respect of black leaders such as Frederick Douglass. The establishment of a Populist party gained much black support. Some white southerners now aided blacks more openly when they ran for office on the Populist ticket. Rumors that black domination in the party had

become a danger led to the failure of black populism in the South.

Douglass maintained silence on the black Populist movement, but continued to oppose the "dangers" of the Democratic Party. As the Foreign Minister to Haiti in 1889, Douglass became involved in negotiations for the use of a Haitian port by United States' warships. The ensuing failure to procure this port led many to criticize Douglass' ability as a diplomat. The fault, however, fell on the United States Diplomatic Corps and the practice of power politics, not with Douglass. Yet Douglass' ambassadorial career was not entirely successful. He did not speak out strongly against harsh criticism of his actions. Douglass steadfastly maintained that the Republican party was the only hope for the protection of civil rights and had nothing but distrust for the Democratic party. Douglass was an extraordinary example of a party loyalist and a black civil rights activist.

The Republican party which Douglass had supported so strongly began to factionalize by the 1880's. At this time the first Lily-White movements began. This white Republican faction in the South emerged slowly upon the national scene. There is very little information available on either the Lily-Whites or the Black and Tan Republicans, who they opposed. Only one full length study of the emergence of these two factions exist, Black Republicans: The Politics of the Black and Tans, by Hanes Walton, Jr.



In the South the Democrats termed the Republican party the "Negro party". When whites moved into the party, conflicts occurred over which faction could gain control. The Black and Tans played important roles at national conventions, but the group did not always exist in a permanent form as an organization. Black roots in the Republican party grew out of the beginning of the party itself, with the anti-slavery movement. In 1867, as a result of their Reconstruction Act, Congressional Radicals reorganized the South both politically and militarily. Scalawag was the term used to describe white southerners who joined the Republican party. Carpetbaggers were Northerners who moved into the South after the Civil War to become involved in Republican politics and economic endeavors. Blacks formed a fragile coalition with these groups. The Scalawags "had little enthusiasm for one aspect of the Radical program: the promoting of equal civil and political rights to the Negroes."<sup>35</sup> This political coalition began to break down over time. Factionalism grew as internal rivalries formed over patronage. The Carpetbaggers and Scalawags fought each other over positions as blacks assumed more offices. This increase caused whites to attempt to limit the offices blacks could hold, creating a further weakening of the coalition.

The split of the party into Liberal Republicans and Stalwarts in 1872 contributed to further problems, while the Democratic party gained strength. Pressure from

Liberal Republicans continued to strain Radical construction objectives. Terrorist methods against blacks were so effective that "to vote meant the loss of a job, medical aid, credit, food, supplies, and materials."<sup>36</sup> The southern Republican party had started to disintegrate. An ex-Confederate Colonel who had been a Republican remarked that for a white southerner to join the Republican party meant "a life of social isolation and ... political oblivion."<sup>37</sup> Slowly, the white supremacists had regained Democratic party domination in nearly every southern state by these methods. These Democrats controlled the economy of the land. The Republican party in the South had been reduced to blacks and only a small group of dedicated whites.

This Republican coalition continued to weaken over time after the compromise of 1877. The post Reconstruction presidents developed southern policies which subordinated blacks. Hayes appeased southern whites in his struggle to reduce sectionalism. Garfield and Arthur tended to support the Independents. The actions of Harrison elevated whites to positions of control in the Republican party. A new southern white Republican party formed to compete with the Democrats who were known as the "white man's party." The Republicans "felt it necessary to purge their party of its black supporters and leaders ... [with] ... the demand for white supremacy in all areas and the insistence that politics was white man's business."<sup>38</sup> Blacks could not

switch to the Democratic party in the South due to the principles of supremacy. These principles had begun to permeate the southern Republican party. The blacks found themselves tied to the party of emancipation and civil rights. Following Reconstruction, black criticism of the Republican party was kept at a minimum through the judicious use of patronage and black appointments.

## CHAPTER II

### FROM PROGRESSIVISM THROUGH WORLD WAR I

Republican Senator, Joseph M. Dolph from Oregon, introduced a bill in December of 1890 designed to investigate whether voting rights had been denied to blacks in the South. The action came shortly after a change in the Mississippi Constitution prohibited black voting. The Senate never voted on Dolph's bill. Against Dolph's wishes, Congress repealed enforcement legislation for voting rights in 1894. President Cleveland approved this Congressional action without hesitation.

In 1898 Louisiana adopted the use of a "grandfather clause" in its constitution. The clause raised property qualifications for voting, making it nearly impossible for blacks to vote. By 1900 black disfranchisement became a characteristic of almost every southern state. Few blacks from the South remained in national or local politics after laws entered state constitutions. One of the last blacks in Congress during the post-Reconstruction period was Senator George H. White from North Carolina. He attempted to defend blacks against attacks from southern Congressmen. White claimed that "it is easy for these gentlemen to taunt us with our inferiority ... when the accuser closes the avenue of industrial pursuits to us."<sup>1</sup>

Just as White stated, the position of blacks at the turn of the century was not limited only by political developments. Employment opportunities, when available, brought only the most menial position for blacks.

Unionization almost entirely overlooked this segment of the work force. The Knights of Labor organized over 60,000 blacks into their union, but it virtually disappeared after the Haymarket riot in Chicago in 1886.<sup>2</sup> Many other unions excluded blacks from participation, such as the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the Order of Railroad Conductors. In the railroad industry, few blacks were allowed into the more skilled positions other than brakemen, switchmen or flagmen. Most businesses forced blacks to accept lower wages. By 1900, 86.7 percent of employed blacks had positions in agriculture or domestic service.<sup>3</sup> Other organizations often rejected black membership entirely, such as the General Federation of Women, the League of American Wheelmen, and the Philadelphia Journalists Club. Black membership to white organizations in the South rarely occurred.

In reaction to southern oppression and discrimination from organizations, some blacks fled to other areas hoping for better work and more equal conditions. Most found that their new home was no better than the place they left. The black farmers, who migrated from the south in the "exodus" of 1879 found that Kansas was no paradise. Frederick Douglass called those who escaped the South "the dupes and victims of cunning and fraud."<sup>4</sup> One movement of blacks to Oklahoma Territory in the 1880's ended when the combined efforts of the whites and Indians who lived there forced the blacks out.

Poor southern living conditions had created these attempts at escape. Working and social conditions remained at almost the same level as before the Civil War. The press viewed blacks negatively, often painting them as animals. Newspapers in the north appeared to approve of the actions "that were driving the Negro relentlessly to the nadir of the post-Reconstruction period."<sup>5</sup> Many magazines ridiculed blacks and made them the subject of malicious humor.

Within this age of open racism, some positive developments broke through. By 1890 blacks had published over 150 newspapers.<sup>6</sup> Black businesses, such as the National Benefit Insurance Company and the Capital Savings Bank, grew into reputable establishments. The Spanish - American War brought black fighting units into important military roles. Two crack Negro regiments charged up San Juan Hill, supporting the "Rough Riders". Four black regiments fought in the regular United States Army. They gave blacks "a pride and faith in themselves that compensated somewhat for the general contempt in which Negroes were held."<sup>7</sup>

One final attempt at upholding black voting rights in the South came from a bill sponsored by Representative Henry Cabot Lodge (R.-Massachusetts). The Federal Elections Bill of 1890 passed in the House, but failed in the Senate, where Lodge would later serve. Senate Republicans hoped to win support from the Democrats on a high

tariff, and silver legislation, and abandoned the elections bill. The last major opportunity for Republican revival of a black constituency passed, "and thus was maintained the practice of favoring business or other interests at the expense of civil rights."<sup>8</sup>

Ohio Governor, William McKinley, fit into the Republican pattern of support for the party's civil rights objectives, but not to the extent of bringing the issue to the forefront. By the time McKinley became president in 1897, two discernable parts of the Republican party had formed in the South, the Lily-Whites and the Black and Tans. The Black and Tans' voting power, already weak, now dwindled due to the practices of the southern states. Blacks found themselves barred from the polls by state constitutions. The reduction of community support for the Black and Tans made them nothing more than "self seeking little groups looking to Washington, D.C. for support."<sup>9</sup> McKinley supported the Lily-White faction, and gave some patronage to blacks. The 1896 United States Supreme Court decision (Plessy vs. Ferguson), declared that separate and equal facilities were legal. Yet McKinley did not dispute that the decision of the court was correct.

For the 1896 election, McKinley needed more votes at the Republican Convention to be nominated. He sent Mark Hanna, his political advisor, on a tour of the South. Here Hanna offered promises of patronage to gain the support of each faction for McKinley. Black delegates from the South

attended the 1896 convention, but the position of blacks in the party was questioned by them while there. Most hotels at the convention site in St. Louis discriminated against them.<sup>10</sup> Many black delegates found their only quarters in railroad cars specially prepared for them. These influential blacks, however, successfully gained the nomination for McKinley.

McKinley had his own problems in the South during the election. The Republican percentage of the southern vote fell to a lower level than any since Reconstruction. McKinley's major objective when elected was to make up for his lack of popularity with southern whites by promoting national unity between North and South. Blacks reacted harshly to McKinley's political move for unity. The black newspaper editor, T. Thomas Fortune, proclaimed that McKinley was "a man of jelly, who would turn us loose on the mob and not say a word."<sup>11</sup> He appeared to be more concerned with placating southern whites, in an effort to draw them to the Republican party, than to improve civil rights.

The most pressing civil rights problem during McKinley's presidency was lynching, which had become widespread in the South by 1900. Over 100 occurred every year.<sup>12</sup> McKinley recognized the problem in his inaugural address, but did nothing to prevent the activity. Lynchings occurred in almost every state. Often the police department and local officials were involved. Lynchings



became a way of terrorizing the community and enforcing white supremacy in the South. Two congressional attempts at ending lynching failed. The first came from a petition to Congress by Republican Senator Shelby M. Cullom of Illinois in 1900. It contained over 3200 signatures asking for an end to the illegal practice.<sup>13</sup> In a debate over presenting the petition to McKinley, Republican Senator, William E. Chandler from New Hampshire, argued that it was not the right of the federal government to punish crime in the states, other than the protection of voting as explained in the Fifteenth Amendment. Another bill, presented by Republican Congressman George White from North Carolina, was designed to do away with mob violence. This bill never got out of the House Judiciary Committee.

Lynching was not the only threat. A second danger to civil rights came from southern attempts at disfranchisement. Support for the protection of black voting rights could thwart McKinley's struggle for national unity and reconciliation with southerners, so he took no major action. Two such proposals over the voting rights issue died in committee. One black congressman, John R. Lynch, attempted to add a plank to the 1900 Republic Convention Platform which repeated the Fifteenth Amendment clause about the reduction of representation for states which violated voting rights. The delegates rejected the plank. Republican Senator Edgar D. Crumpacker introduced a dissent against a reapportionment bill designed to enforce the

representation clause. Southern senators denounced the reapportionment bill and few members rallied behind it. The motion to discuss the infringement upon voting rights in the bill failed, 94 to 136.<sup>14</sup>

Blacks at the turn of the century continued to play an important role in the party, even through the distressing issues of lynching and disfranchisement. They were influential in the election of McKinley in 1896 and held important positions in the 1900 convention. McKinley, however, refused to do anything to better civil rights in return for this black Republican support.

McKinley's failure as President was the same as many Republican presidents before him. He attempted to gain southern white support in an effort for national unity at the expense of civil rights. Like the others before him, this policy did not successfully win substantial numbers of southern whites to the Republican party. Southern racists could always point to the role of blacks in the Republican party and the influence they held in the 1900 convention as evidence of "Republican unreliability on the racial issue."<sup>15</sup> In many ways McKinley had less of an opportunity for gaining southern white support than did many of his Republican predecessors.

In McKinley's second inaugural address on March 4, 1901, he did not refer to the conditions of blacks. Instead he promised the new found economic and social opportunities that the Republican legislature would create.

In 1899 a group of blacks in Massachusetts wrote a letter to President McKinley on their condition. This account characterized the plight of black Americans. The letter spoke of extreme desperation and awful wrongs and miseries."<sup>16</sup> It asked why McKinley had done nothing during such events as the riot in Wilmington, North Carolina in 1898 and expressed shock over southern disfranchisement. McKinley, however, concerned himself more with the reconciliation of southern whites, prompting him to do little in the way of civil rights reform. Many blacks expressed their disillusionment with the president and the Republican party.

In a letter written to George L. Knox, the editor of a pro-Republican newspaper, The Indianapolis Freeman, expressed reasons why not to support the Republican party in the next election. Knox refuted the letter by stating that black civil existence had been curtailed by the Democratic party and that the Republicans were the only choice. He blamed the southern black's disfranchisement and poor social conditions on the Democrats.

At the turn of the century blacks began moving to northern cities for jobs. These positions filled up quickly and less desirable positions became the norm for blacks in the city. Social and economic problems caused ghettos to develop, complete with unsanitary conditions and a high crime rate. This environment contributed to the growth of various organizations designed to help blacks.

The first was the Niagara movement, (1905-1910). Organized by W.E.B. DuBois, this group called upon blacks to protest openly against the injustices they received. The movement created militancy toward unfair policies.

Another organization, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, (NAACP), organized by Booker T. Washington in 1909, developed less aggressive techniques for civil rights reform. It sought an end to illegal lynching and segregation by concentrating on legal action. Money and legal assistance from some liberal northern whites made the organization more effective in furthering civil rights reform than in the Niagara movement. These whites mellowed many of the militant ideas by stressing the importance of legality to achieve the associations aims.

A more moderate organization, the National League on Urban Conditions among Negroes, or Urban League for short, developed in 1910, did not concern itself with national politics. Instead, it concentrated on the social welfare of blacks in urban conditions. It successfully created better housing and educational facilities in black areas. The Urban League along with the NAACP, was created in the twentieth century for the advancement of blacks, socially, economically and politically.

The formation of new organizations to deal with black problems led to various differences of opinion of what the best method for accomplishing reform could be. Booker T.

Washington believed that the acquisition of a skilled trade and an education would promote the social advancement of blacks in America. He convinced whites in Tuskegee, Alabama, that the black students there could provide services to the town. He constructed a special program for students to work in the town for the good of the community. The success of the program appeared to decrease white hostility toward the blacks. Washington believed that the program would slowly increase black social standing to an equal level with whites. He advised blacks not to migrate from the South, but to learn vocational training for gaining economic independence. Whites in both the north and the south generally accepted Washington's system. Some who believed blacks to be inherently inferior, thought that such training would "keep blacks in their place."

The most common criticism from other civil rights advocates was that Washington's philosophy "did not attack Jim Crow or seek to promote the suffrage of Afro-American people; instead he sought to conciliate whites."<sup>17</sup> W.E.B. DuBois, an instructor at Atlanta University, strongly disagreed with Washington. DuBois had studied at Harvard and in Berlin. His research concentrated on the condition of blacks in the South. He believed that Washington's policy could not bring social equality for blacks. It would not, in DuBois' estimation, bring about a positive change in civil rights. He suggested a more militant philosophy of revolutionary tactics to gain first

class citizenship for blacks. Both DuBois and Washington fought for the same ends, but differed in the methods to achieve this goal.

DuBois and Washington had mixed reactions to Theodore Roosevelt when he ran for president. Some blacks over-emphasized his good deeds and comments about them and were shocked when his actions appeared to go against the cause of civil rights. Roosevelt's early statements supported the party platform in regard to blacks. As Governor of New York, he appointed some blacks and pushed for the desegregation of New York schools. He did not believe, however, that blacks and whites were equal. At certain times he remarked about the effectiveness of lynching as a good penalty for "black rapists" and criticized the performance of black troops during the Spanish American War.

As a politician Roosevelt sought to offend the least number of people while placating the majority. This policy, although not a rare one, caused serious difficulties in his administration. During his first year of office, Roosevelt invited Booker T. Washington to the White House for dinner to discuss appointments for various blacks. Southerners reacted strongly against the meeting. The Memphis Commercial Appeal called the action by Roosevelt, "the most damnable outrage which has ever been perpetrated by any citizen of the United States."<sup>18</sup> Without question, the meeting damaged Roosevelt's reputation among whites.

Roosevelt looked to Booker T. Washington as his main advisor concerning appointments of blacks and white civil rights leaders. James S. Clarkson, a Roosevelt appointee as surveyor of customs for the Port of New York, reported that only Washington and the influence of a few others "was what prevented a stampede of colored men in the north from the Republican party."<sup>19</sup> Roosevelt's discussions with Washington led to some appointments which both northerners and southerners found acceptable. Roosevelt hoped to gain control of the southern political process. Many black appointments were made by Roosevelt to reassure blacks about the intentions of the Republican party. He wanted to create a broad base of party support, yet maintain both black and southern white allegiance.

In some of the federal appointments, Roosevelt's policy backfired. The appointment of William D. Crumm, a black Republican party faithful, as collector of customs in Charleston, South Carolina, took over two years to gain Senate confirmation because of southern white reaction. Another conflict occurred over the reappointment of Minnie M. Cox as town postmistress in Indianola, Mississippi. Local whites had intimidated her into resigning. She claimed that if she did not resign, "there would be trouble." Roosevelt announced the closing of the post office until the town accepted her appointment. He believed that any criticism of his decision was a challenge to national supremacy and presidential authority."<sup>20</sup>

Roosevelt did not make a new appointment for the position until a year later when Mrs. Cox refused to return.

Roosevelt defended these appointments strongly, but by the midterm of his administration he had made fewer federal appointments of blacks than Harrison or McKinley at the same point. Roosevelt discovered the difficulties of trying to satisfy both blacks and whites. His appointments of blacks angered the southerners who believed no blacks should hold public office. His concessions to whites created distrust among blacks.

In the 1904 election Roosevelt attempted to downplay the race issue, believing that he had "nothing to gain and everything to lose by any agitation of the race question."<sup>21</sup> Both southern whites and blacks expressed their indignation at Roosevelt's refusal to take a firm stand. In February, 1905, he gave a Lincoln's Day speech on "the Negro problem." He appealed for national unity, but asked for equality of treatment. His popularity with both blacks and whites in the South quickly improved after the speech, but other events would soon test this new found support.

In the summer of 1906, the Brownsville affair caused considerable unrest among the black population. The affair occurred over the alleged attempted rape of a white woman by a black soldier stationed in Brownsville, Texas. The authorities could not identify or arrest the responsible party for the crime on the grounds that other blacks in the



company protected him. He was never identified. Roosevelt announced that unless he was brought forward, all the members of the black companies involved would be given a dishonorable discharge. Roosevelt carried out the order, ending the careers of 160 servicemen. Blacks across the county heatedly denounced the action, permanently damaging Roosevelt's reputation in their view. A later bill provided for the reenlistment of these blacks, but it did not affect the negative impact of the discharge.

The affair had heightened Roosevelt's view that blacks "too often bond together to shelter their own criminals."<sup>22</sup> Racist ideas, such as these, appeared to grow stronger in the South during Roosevelt's administration. Even some Republicans believed that it was wrong to grant blacks the right to vote. Many thought it right to exclude blacks from politics entirely. One Democrat commented that "now for the first time we learn that the conviction is held also by many candid and thoughtful Republicans."<sup>23</sup>

Few spoke out in defense of civil rights. In the Supreme Court in 1903, the case of Giles vs. Harris sanctioned political disfranchisement because the federal court would not strike down state suffrage provisions. Such events increased black distrust of the Republican party and pushed many blacks to question their party affiliation. Booker T. Washington commented that "the Democratic party does not want the Negro and if he puts himself in a

position of enmity to the Republican, will soon find himself without any political influence in the country." <sup>24</sup>

The opposition to Roosevelt did not break his control of the Republican party. Roosevelt recognized the importance of Black and Tan support at the 1908 Republican convention. The use of the Black and Tan faction of the party drew great criticism from southern whites who hoped to eliminate their political influence. Roosevelt's choice for the 1908 nomination, Secretary of War, William H. Taft, openly sought support from this black section of the party. Roosevelt's recommendation for Taft influenced which of the delegates were chosen for the convention. In the factional fights between the Black and Tans and the Lily-Whites sections of the party, "the contests were decided on the basis of which candidate the faction supported."<sup>25</sup> If the Black and Tans supported Taft, then their delegation participated in the convention. If both the Black and Tans and the Lily-White factions supported Taft, each traveled to the convention with half of the votes. Each delegate was given one-half of a vote from the national committee whenever this occurred.

The results for the seating of delegates were mixed. Louisiana had a split delegation. In Alabama and Arkansas the Black and Tans gained seats. In Virginia where blacks had also been disfranchised, the Black and Tans were seated because the Lily-Whites could not produce an affidavit to refute charges of corruption brought against them

by the Credentials Committee. One committee member remarked, "I must say that you have presented some poor cases in this state."<sup>26</sup>

Some unsuccessful candidates for nomination reacted against this "unfair" treatment. Representative James Burke of Pennsylvania introduced a resolution to reduce representation at the convention from southern states. The resolution's supporters believed that "the rights of the northern states which were necessary for Republican electoral success had been handed over to delegations from southern states which never gave the party any votes in the electoral college."<sup>27</sup> This resolution had little success because of majority support for Taft at the convention.

The same tactics were used by Taft at the 1912 convention. Roosevelt challenged him for the nomination, but the Taft forces defeated his bid for another term. Roosevelt accused Taft of "stealing" the nomination, but Elihu Root, a Taft supporter, chaired the convention. Root ruled that the contested delegates were fairly chosen, and the convention agreed with his decision.

Roosevelt's failure to gain the Republican nomination in 1912 forced him to organize the Bull Moose party, composed of progressive Republicans, to challenge Taft. As the nominee of this new party, he sought to strengthen southern white opposition. This struggle created a division in the southern wing of the Republican party,

already complicated by Black and Tan and Lily-White factions. These problems made black loyalty to the Republican party very difficult to maintain. The conservative-progressive fight for control increased the political flight of some blacks from the party.

Roosevelt's progressivism did not embrace blacks. Neither The Bull Moose nor the Republican party platforms had any mention of black rights in 1912. Bishop Alexander Walters, President of the Colored Democratic League, remarked that "the dullest mind can see at a glance the difference between the Republican party as represented by Charles Sumner in 1870 and Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft in 1912."<sup>29</sup> He recommended that blacks shift their allegiance permanently to the Democrats. The efforts of progressives to build strong white opposition failed by 1913, after the Democrats gained the right to dispense Federal patronage jobs.

Roosevelt had attempted to placate black voters through appointments, but Taft "failed to see or follow the humanitarian mission associated with the Republican party, with the result that Negroes both North and South began to drift toward the Democratic party."<sup>30</sup> Blacks, though apparently abandoned by Taft and the Republicans, had difficulty switching parties because of Democratic resolve to remove them entirely from politics. It appeared that blacks could gain more from the Republicans than they could from the Democrats in regard to federal appointments.

Secondly, because of their romantic view of the Republican party, of Lincoln and emancipation still continued to hold some black allegiance.

The progressives were not an adequate choice for a political switch. The role of the progressives as agents of change contrasted directly with southern Democratic disfranchisement. Theodore Roosevelt typified this period. The major progressive concerns were economic and business matters, along with transportation, natural resources and local government reform.

Some blacks made the jump to the Democratic party in 1912. W.E.B. DuBois, newspaper editor William M. Trotter, and William R. Garrison's grandson, Oswald S. Villard, all supported Woodrow Wilson in the 1912 election. Black elected officials also reflected this change. By 1912 only one southern state had a black Republican governor, Tennessee. Southern state legislatures contained only a few blacks and Democrats controlled these states. By the election of Woodrow Wilson, all eleven southern states went Democratic.

Wilson's relation to the progressive movement grew from old populist ideas such as women's suffrage, child labor laws, workmen's compensation, and minimum wages. Black equality, however, was not one of these goals. In fact, Wilson said little about the race question. During his administration resolutions for the repeal of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments increased greatly over

similar occurrences in the Roosevelt or Taft administrations. Southerners presented many racist bills such as civil service segregation clauses and anti-intermarriage laws. Wilson extended segregation into some Federal Departments, such as the Post Office Department and the Bureau of Printing and Engraving. The protest of northern liberals halted this process when the Treasury Department desegregated in 1914. Blacks voiced outrage over these issues and reversed their opinion of Wilson's progressivism.

During World War I, Blacks overwhelmingly supported U.S. involvement to "make the world safe for democracy." None of the demands blacks made, however, such as desegregation in the military and adequate battlefield training for black soldiers were met. Most of those sent overseas became cooks or simple laborers. President Wilson sent warnings to black troops that they must be willing to accept the same social status when they returned as had existed before the war. In the United States a massive black northern migration brought new labor to the major cities. Blacks found jobs in the war industries. Between 1915 and 1918 over 500,000 blacks moved North.<sup>31</sup> Another 500,000 joined the migration by the 1920's. These new workers had limits that barred them from trade unions and segregated them from whites. New racial tensions brought violence to urban areas. The most violent riot occurred in Chicago in 1919. This clash between whites and blacks killed 38 and wounded over 500.<sup>32</sup>

During this period of unrest a "back to Africa" movement began to grow under the direction of Marcus Garvey. While in Jamaica he organized the Universal Negro Improvement Association in 1914. It grew to a membership of over two million by 1916. The doctrines developed by the organization included the condemnation of the imperialism of Europe in Africa, world wide racial oppression, lynching, discrimination and segregation. It called upon blacks to defend themselves against injustice. The ultimate aim of the movement came in the proposed recolonization of blacks to Africa. The idea ended with financial collapse and a prison sentence for Garvey, who was convicted for mail fraud in his struggle for colonization.

## CHAPTER III

### THE 1920'S THROUGH THE NEW DEAL

The 1920 convention had three contesting candidates, General Leonard Wood, Governor Frank O. Lowden from Illinois and Senator Hiram W. Johnson of California. None of these candidates proved able to win majority support though they all campaigned heavily in the South for Black and Tan support before the convention. Three states had delegations with votes split between the Lily-White and Black and Tans factions. Most of the other southern states had internal struggles between each group. A deadlock occurred at the convention between Lowden and Wood with support evenly split. In Mississippi, Alabama, and North Carolina the Black and Tans were seated by the credentials committee. In Arkansas, Virginia, and South Carolina, the Lily-Whites were seated. Senator Warren G. Harding, a dark horse candidate from Ohio won nomination on the tenth ballot. Lily-Whites at the convention successfully introduced a resolution to limit southern representation to four at-large delegates.<sup>1</sup>

In the 1920 campaign, Warren G. Harding attempted to gain support from the South, while not destroying the party affiliation of the recently migrated black northerners. Harding had the advantage of black outrage over racism in the Wilson presidency. After the election, however, the Republican party failed to uphold its belief in equality. Harding, like Republican presidents before him, tried to



reconcile both the white south and the blacks to support the Republican party. This policy reflected the problems Republicans had when trying to hold both the party and the country together simultaneously. The question of race further complicated this difficulty.

Shortly after Harding's election he met with the black poet, James Weldon Johnson to discuss the "Negro problem." The issues of black disfranchisement, lynching and the Ku Klux Klan were the most common problems. Johnson requested that Harding make several black appointments and create an interracial commission to study these problems to which Harding agreed. In 1921 he made a speech to Congress criticizing lynching and announcing the possible creation of the commission. He did not become specific in his address, but he drew praise from black leaders. W.E.B. DuBois commented that "this is the strongest pronouncement on the race problem ever made by a President in a message to Congress."<sup>2</sup> Harding did not fulfill such strong expectations.

Harding never pushed for civil rights legislation again, and appeared to have only a superficial understanding of racial problems. In a speech to blacks in Birmingham, Alabama on October 26, 1921, Harding reassured the white southerners that social equality of the races did not exist, yet he promoted the concept of political equality to halt growing black criticism about his

policies. Harding's popularity among blacks decreased sharply in the first year of his presidency. Most blacks thought that Harding's interest in strengthening the Lily-White organizations in the South had intensified. Harding's actions justified their fears.

Early in 1921 Harding warned that any new black appointments in the South might arouse white resentment. The Republican National Committee responded to this declaration by announcing a new plan for reorganization of the southern party organization. This new plan called for a reduction of black involvement in the party, and a change in the allotment of delegates to the national convention. Blacks strongly protested against these changes.

Local problems for black life also increased during the Harding administration. During the early 1920's the increase in Klan activities created serious southern racial tensions. Harding did not know how to deal with the problem. His reluctance to use federal authority in this instance demonstrated lack of presidential effectiveness. In 1922 he wrote that "I do not know the most practical method of dealing with the Ku Klux Klan."<sup>3</sup> Harding's lack of action lost the goodwill of many blacks to the Republican party.

Neither did Harding do anything to slow the practice of segregation which had increased since the Wilson administration. Harding appeared to show great insensitivity to the feelings of blacks throughout his presidency,

although his lack of understanding and naivete contributed to the problem. He appointed very few blacks to office because of an interest in maintaining a good image among white southerners, and reorganizing the Republican party along Lily-White lines. Harding made only a handful of black appointments. Blacks became disappointed by the results of the administration, and the Republican party. In 1923, a group of black leaders met to denounce Harding for his civil rights failures. The leader of the meeting, Dr. George E. Cannon, attacked Harding for not recognizing black problems. With Harding's death in August, 1923, blacks had become increasingly more frustrated with the Republican party and Republican administrations.

Few blacks expressed optimism that the Coolidge administration could further the cause of civil rights any better than Harding's presidency. Coolidge's attitude on the subject was not known when he first entered office in August, 1923. The NAACP tried to educate him on the current racial problems, but he made no commitments to any programs. James Weldon Johnson notified Coolidge about many difficulties, such as the failure of the Republican party to fully support the Dyer anti-lynching bill, and the wide-scale disfranchisement in the South. Coolidge commented on these problems in his first message to Congress and brought encouragement to black leaders, but most of his statements were vaguely worded. He attacked

the crime of lynching in his speech, but he refused to later support the anti-lynching bill.

Coolidge disappointed blacks during his first year in office. Unlike Theodore Roosevelt's association with Booker T. Washington, or Harding's relationship with Johnson, Coolidge had little personal contact with blacks. One of Coolidge's first major appointments was Congressman C. Bascom Sless (R.-Virginia) as presidential secretary. Sless's opposition to anti-lynching laws and promotion of Lily-Whitism angered blacks greatly. Critics' reaction to the appointment caused Coolidge to downplay Sless's role in the administration. Coolidge attempted not to offend blacks or push for as much Lily-White reform as had Harding. Coolidge's appointments demonstrated this policy. One of his choices was civil rights advocate, Senator William Butler, (R.-Massachusetts) to head his preconvention organization.

On other issues, however, Coolidge did not act. He failed to take a stand on the Klan, unlike the nominees for president from the Progressive and Democratic parties. This silence gained the disreputable support of the Klan for Coolidge's election for president in 1924. Black resentment for his policy on this and other racial questions led some to look for viable alternatives to the Republican party in the 1924 election.

W.E.B. DuBois at first agreed to the formation of a third party before settling on the Progressive party

candidate, Robert M. LaFollette (R.-Wisconsin). DuBois proclaimed that God might "write us down as asses if ever again we are found putting our trust in either the Republican or Democratic Parties."<sup>4</sup> Most blacks refused to lessen their historical attachment to the Republican party and did not follow up on DuBois' request for a third party. The Democrats, aware of black unrest in the Republican ranks, began an appeal for them to join the Democratic party.

The defeat of an anti-Klan plank at the Democratic National Convention did not hamper the presidential nominee, John M. Davis, from denouncing race prejudice and bigotry in his acceptance speech. He spoke to blacks in New York City and campaigned for black votes in his home state of West Virginia. Even with the Republican problem of diminishing black allegiance, Coolidge returned to the presidency in 1924 with a landslide vote. Southern states had not supported him, and some blacks rejected the Republican party, but the results did not change.

During this administration, Coolidge again failed to act on civil rights issues. In 1926, after a meeting with a delegation from the National Equal Rights League, it appeared certain that Coolidge would attempt to abolish departmental segregation, but this did not come about. One member of the committee, Kelly Miller, complained that "we waited twenty months and nothing happened."<sup>5</sup> It took an act by Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, to order an

end to racial segregation and discrimination in the Department of Commerce. Southern members of Congress instituted strong criticism against Hoover's reform.

During Coolidge's administration, Republicans cared little about questions of race. They did not take advantage of their leadership and failed to assume responsibility for civil rights. Political conditions had worsened for blacks during the 1920's. The Republicans showed little concern and neglected both their opportunity for reform and the chance to win a more solid black Republican constituency. Republican leaders had appeared to lose a basic understanding of black problems by the 1920's. A penalty for this lack of foresight came from a resolution adopted by the NAACP in 1926. This proclamation stated that "our political salvation and our social survival lie in our absolute independence of party allegiance in politics."<sup>6</sup>

Herbert Hoover brought no relief to black disillusionment over the Republican party. His tenure as head of a southern relief committee during spring floods in 1927 brought charges of beatings and brutality in refugee camps.<sup>7</sup> Blacks had acquired a negative view of Hoover even before he ran for president. Very little discussion at the convention included the issue of race, but the platform did contain one line devoted to the enactment of an anti-lynching law.

Black and Tans organizations and the Lily-White segment of the Republican party began to prepare for a struggle in the 1928 election. Herbert Hoover, however, used money to pay off many Lily-White and Black and Tan delegations equally for his nomination. He won easily on the first ballot. Hoover announced shortly after his election that the southern Republican party must reorganize and he commended the Lily-Whites for their support. Hoover was able to use the Black and Tan delegates to "secure his nomination and afterwards dropped them and promoted the Lily-Whites."<sup>8</sup> He openly worked with the Lily-White organizations and sponsored them to attract Southern Democrats into the Republican party. After Hoover's election the Black and Tan factions began to disappear. The delegations no longer held power at the conventions. Small pockets of Black and Tans existed until the 1960's, but with little effect on the party. Hoover's attack on the southern black Republicans "spelled the doom of the Black influence in Southern Republican organization."<sup>9</sup>

During the campaign, Hoover continued to support the Lily-White organization. He supported the prosecution of a Special Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General, Perry Howard, a black from Mississippi, for selling federal patronage. Most whites in this practice escaped any legal action. Hoover had convinced many blacks that they were no longer welcome in the Republican party.

Blacks viewed the Democratic candidate, Al Smith, with equal suspicion. For various reasons, blacks generally rejected Democrats. Smith was Catholic, associated with racist southerners, and they remembered the experience of Democratic racism in the Wilson administration. DuBois believed that "it does not matter a tinker's damn which of these gentlemen succeed. With minor exceptions, they stand for the same thing."<sup>10</sup>

Hoover won the 1928 election easily, gaining more votes than any other Republican presidential candidate ever. Blacks did not vote for Hoover in large numbers, giving little incentive for new Republican moves in civil rights. During 1929 no new appointments appeared. Dr. Robert Morton, President of the Tuskegee Institute, conferred with Hoover and recommended that several black appointments be made. The result was the reappointment of James A. Cobb as judge in the District of Columbia. Several other appointments were made, but few came directly from the President. DuBois commented that Hoover could only be regarded as "the man in the Lily White House!"<sup>11</sup>

The election of Hoover, apparently a negative step for civil rights, accomplished the political organization of blacks. In one instance, the appointment of a white southern Circuit Court Judge from North Carolina, John J. Parker, to the Supreme Court caused the launching of vigorous campaigns against his confirmation. The Senate rejected him. Hoover's appointment of a commission on law



enforcement did not contain any blacks and it showed no interest in looking at the problems of lynching, mob violence, segregation or disfranchisement.

Hoover not only failed to win approval of his administration's actions from black Americans but he also made no attempt to gain their support. By the 1930's, the economic collapse preoccupied Hoover's thoughts. Blacks played a diminishing role in the Republican party and when presented with a viable alternative presidential candidate, would switch their allegiance. The 1932 Republican platform brought no new hope. Many blacks defected from the party in the election. Richard B. Sherman noted that the black political situation was changing:

It was not that the Republicans had not been warned. For years black leaders cautioned the GOP about the possible consequences of its racial policies. But it was to no avail, primarily because there was no immediate political necessity for most Republicans to listen to the Negroes' complaints. To be heard, Negroes had to show that they had political power, the ability to reward or punish their friends and enemies at the polls. For this reason, Negro leaders often overrated the strength of black voters; they did not hold the balance of power in presidential elections as some claimed. At the same time, they were wise to preach the necessity of political independence. Negroes had to abandon their automatic loyalty to the Republican party if politicians were to cease taking their votes for granted.<sup>12</sup>

The Hoover administration's policies gave blacks adequate cause to bolt the Republican party in the 1932 election. T. Arnold Hill, the National Urban League's industrial relations director, commented that "at no time in the history of the Negro since slavery has his economic

and social outlook seemed so discouraging."<sup>13</sup> The problems of the depression and the racist attitudes of Hoover brought great disappointment to blacks. The alternative to Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt, appeared to most blacks as equally unworthy. As the Governor of New York, Roosevelt had shown little attention to black problems. Blacks found themselves in the dilemma of choosing between known evil political structure, or the Democratic party with its history of oppression. Neither party appeared particularly concerned which candidate the blacks would chose.

The total number of blacks able to vote in the United States made up less than 3 percent of the national total.<sup>14</sup> Disfranchisement limited over two-thirds of possible black voters. In the election of 1932 the Republicans expected these few black voters to base their allegiance to the party on tradition. At the last minute, just before the Republican National Convention, Hoover met with black leaders on the White House lawn. Most blacks saw the appearance as election propaganda. Roosevelt spoke to black reporters and promised protection for the citizenship of Negroes. He also alluded to the possible appointment of blacks without discrimination. The Republicans believed that Roosevelt's running mate, Congressman John N. Garner from Texas, could help more than hinder the chances of retaining black voters in the Republican party. Garner, however, asserted equality

before the law and issued a statement affirming sympathy for black problems.

The Republicans attempted to convey during the election that it was safer to stay with them than to "swap horses in the middle of a stream."<sup>15</sup> Democrats argued in return that no president could be worse than Hoover. The black voter did not appear to make any difference in the election. If they remained loyal to the Republican party, they could expect no major change from past Republican presidents. If blacks for the first time divided their votes, then both parties might bid for their support. When the election results came, no radical change in black voting had occurred, but Roosevelt had gained the presidency.

The statistics show that Hoover actually gained more black votes than in 1928, while losing the election. The insignificance of the black vote was evident in the 1932 election. The major issue, the depression, limited any serious discussion of the civil rights problems affecting blacks. One black wrote in 1932 that "within a couple of years we will be talking about 'the good old Hoover days' and ... Roosevelt will be as unpopular ... as Hoover is today."<sup>16</sup>

During the Depression, blacks suffered the most. Their unemployment ran twice as high as whites. Discrimination, already low wages, and poor living conditions contributed to the development of organizations by blacks

for relief. One such organization, was the National Negro Congress, formed in 1936. Like the Negro conferences before the Civil War, this organization contained blacks from every political group who condemned segregation, lynching, and disfranchisement. The Congress advocated relief and trade union status for the unemployed and poor working blacks. In 1937, the Southern Negro Congress which fought for social change in black American was formed. One year later the Southern Conference for Human Welfare was created. It brought about a coalition of blacks and white northern liberals to discuss major problems. By the late 1940's these groups had faded from the scene, but some of their demands gained incorporation into New Deal programs and future political party platforms.

Blacks generally benefited from the New Deal. Roosevelt's measures for repairing the American economy helped greatly. Federal banking reconstruction (RFC), insured that blacks would not again lose their savings because of the federal government's guarantee of repayment. Business loans bailed out failing shops and factories. The New Deal created new employment opportunities for blacks in public works. The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), gave work to those who were unemployed by the depression. The Works Progress Administration (WPA), also contributed to the hiring of many unemployed blacks. The Southern Tenant Farmers Association helped blacks by providing low cost

housing loans. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), allotted cash to black farmers for not overproducing, although some were cheated and discriminated against. Electricity for black homes in the South came from work done by the Rural Electrification Administration (REA). For the first time, blacks gained the ability to buy new homes through the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC). Much reform, however, did not take place. Many blacks were left out of the social welfare programs. In 1935 the Social Security Act exempted agricultural and domestic labor. Blacks did not gain from unemployment compensation because the states controlled the payments and often discriminated against them.

Shortly after Roosevelt's election he gathered a group of influential blacks together to form a "black cabinet." This organization advised Roosevelt on black problems and sought to end segregation, discrimination, and disfranchisement. The administration failed to alleviate many of these problems. Lynching, poll taxes, and segregation continued to plague black America. Not until World War II was some reform brought to these areas.

The election of 1936 brought blacks into the Democratic camp on a massive scale. The economic plight had further stimulated the migration of blacks to northern cities. This new northern black population voted for Roosevelt's New Deal and against the Republican party's traditional appeal. Roosevelt's landslide came from a 60.8

percent share of the popular vote. In this election the influence of black voting, like elections before, did not make much difference. Black political allegiance, however, had changed dramatically. In the major cities, the Democrats gained a huge percentage of the black vote. In Chicago the black vote for the Democrats increased 132 percent over those which voted in 1932. In Cleveland the figure rose by 250 percent.<sup>18</sup>

The results of the election brought on many questions about the change in black voting patterns. Why did blacks desert the Republican party? There are different schools of thought on this question. Two sources offer the interpretation that blacks joined the Democratic party because of the positive civil rights record of the New Deal. Howard Sitkoff's A New Deal for Blacks and Leslie H. Fishel Jr.'s The Negro in the New Deal Era take this viewpoint. But Nancy J. Weiss in Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, believed that blacks voted Democratic not because of Roosevelt's civil rights measures but because the New Deal brought economic opportunity. Weiss states that "it was Franklin Roosevelt's ability to provide jobs, not his embrace of civil rights, that made him a hero to black Americans." <sup>19</sup>

Blacks idolized Roosevelt. One newspaper letter called Roosevelt "the greatest president America has ever had."<sup>20</sup> Blacks fell susceptible to the Roosevelt charm and personality. The New Deal left many civil rights

reforms undone, but it created black political activity, gave them a hero, and enlisted them in the Democratic party. The election of 1940 gave the Republicans a chance to recapture black allegiance. This, however, was not possible because of the recent Republican attempts at winning white southern support and the perceived success of the New Deal economic programs. Blacks had now firmly placed themselves in the Democratic camp.

## CHAPTER IV

### REPUBLICANS, BLACKS AND POSTWAR AMERICA

Blacks played an important role in World War Two. After the 1936 Berlin Olympics, in which Hitler insulted them as members of an inferior race, blacks gained an understanding of the fascist danger. In 1938 Joe Louis' sensational first round victory over the German boxer, Max Schmeling, gave many blacks a feeling of pride. The attack by Mussolini on Ethiopia and the Spanish Civil War involved blacks even before the United States joined the war. Because of these world events, blacks slowly increased their numbers in the U.S. armed forces. In 1940, less than 10,000 blacks had entered the military, but three million registered after the establishment of the Selective Service System. By 1945, over 700,000 blacks had joined.<sup>1</sup>

There was much pressure to use these black troops abroad. Those which did go to Europe were often faced with discrimination. In 1942 a special order came from Congress which outlawed the practice of discrimination in the training and creation of new officers. By the end of the war, however, only a few blacks had become officers in each service. The military continued to segregate black soldiers. Only the Merchant Marine integrated its service at the beginning of the war.

The war did, however, bring some basic reforms. A. Phillip Randolph, founder of the Brotherhood of Sleeping



Porters, threatened a march on Washington, D.C. in 1941 shortly after Franklin D. Roosevelt instituted actions which affirmed equal opportunity employment, the institution of non-discriminatory vocational training, and the elimination of discrimination in government contracts. To enforce these stipulations, Roosevelt created the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC). These changes established new opportunities for blacks to get better jobs. The war brought on the need for a strong labor force in the expanding northern industries. This caused a steady increase in black migration to the North.

Social changes accelerated during the war. The Committee on Participation of Negroes in the National Defense Program began in 1940. Congressman Hamilton Fish (R-New York) successfully introduced a non-discrimination amendment to the Selective Service Act. It required further action, however, to eliminate segregation in each military department. Roosevelt's war appointments of some blacks, like that of Major Campbell C. Johnson as Executive Assistant to the Director of the Selective Service, expanded black participation in the war effort. In the labor force, unions sought to reduce discrimination. Both the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations increased their memberships for black workers.

The increased northern migration caused some racial problems in the cities. In 1943, a riot in Detroit

occurred because of competition for jobs, housing shortages and racism. Roosevelt sent 6,000 soldiers to halt the conflict; 43 deaths occurred and hundreds were injured.

The courts dealt with some of these issues. Using the Interstate Commerce Act, the courts prevented discrimination against any railroad passengers because of race. The courts also moved against discrimination in employment. In a 1944 case, Grovey vs. Townsend, (1944), the court declared that party membership qualified voters in primaries to select the nominees for a general election. This decision ended the "white primary" system in the South. Although the decision only applied to Texas, many other southern states accepted it. Small numbers of blacks began registering to vote in southern primaries after this decision.

In 1944, Roosevelt was reelected. Most Americans agreed that he was an able wartime leader who had brought the country out of the Depression through the use of economic reform. World War II had presented many blacks with new hope and opportunity for the future of civil rights. The Republican party's role in civil rights, however, appeared slight, now that much black allegiance had withered away. Post war events witnessed a continuing growth of black dissatisfaction with the Republican position on numerous issues.

Republican and Democratic platforms in 1944 showed one reason however, why the GOP gained some black votes that

year. The Republicans pledged to attack discrimination in the armed services, while the Democrats made only vague statements on civil rights. The Republicans attempted to fulfill this plank in their platform. Republican Senator William Langer of North Dakota worked on a number of civil rights proposals and successfully brought about legislation to remove a poll tax on servicemen for general elections. Southern Democrats attempted to write a segregationist clause into Langer's main bill, but the House rejected this move.

In 1938, Gunnar Myrdal took on the project of formulating a comprehensive study of blacks in the United States. Six years later, the project resulted in the publication of An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. The study had a great impact on American politics and social attitudes about blacks. Myrdal, a Swedish economist, used a large research team of scholars to complete this task.

One of the members of the research team was a black scholar, Ralph Bunche, who wrote a lengthy memorandum for the work entitled "The Political Status of the Negro." This report helped to shape An American Dilemma. Bunche laced the memorandum with his own opinion about the political plight of blacks in America, and specifically the South. He based the work on the New Deal period and attempted to point out the discrepancies which existed between civil rights and the American political structure.

Bunche opened with a discussion of the historical background to the problem of black politics followed by a description of the lack of southern black political action. He criticized the one-party system in the South and noted the near absence of Republican involvement in the region. Bunche claimed that "Republicanism in the South has largely reduced to a fight for control of party patronage when Republican presidents grace the White House." Bunche discussed the black political problems of voter registration and discrimination in the South. In his final assessment, he explained how the Republican party became the "white man's party" during the Roosevelt years, both at the national and local levels. Bunche concluded by noting the general degeneration of the local Republican party.

The memorandum of Bunche's and the work of the research contributed greatly to the production of An American Dilemma. Myrdal developed a general thesis from his study about racial problems in the United States. He believed that white Americans suffered from the dilemma of the way in which their society treated blacks as contrasted with the American creed of freedom and equality. Myrdal predicted that this paradox would force reform in civil rights during the post-war period.

Myrdal thought that the impact of World War Two on America would stimulate black social and political action. The war created the dilemma that blacks who had fought

against racism abroad in the Hitler regime, now found themselves discriminated against in their home country. Myrdal asserted that this contradiction in the American political structure created a problem in the minds of whites and contributed to black frustration. Myrdal explained his thesis in the preface of the work:

The American Negro problem is a problem in the heart of the American. It is there that the inter-racial tension has its focus. It is there that the decisive struggle goes on. This is the central viewpoint of this treatise ... At the bottom of our problem is the moral dilemma of the American--the conflict between his moral valuations on various levels of consciousness and generality. The "American Dilemma" referred to in the title of this book is the ever raging conflict between, on the one hand, the valuations preserved on the general plane which we shall call the "American Creed" where the American thinks, talks, and acts under the influence of high national and Christian precepts, and on the other hand, the valuations on specific planes of individual and group living, where personal and local interests; economic, social, and sexual jealousies; considerations of community prestige and conformity; group prejudice against particular persons or types of people; and all sorts of miscellaneous wants, impulses, and habits dominate his outlook.<sup>3</sup>

Myrdal believed that the racial problem was a white problem. He concluded that black life was a reaction to white pressure. Whites rationalized and justified the inequality of blacks. Myrdal cited examples of growing black militancy against the status quo. In Myrdal's opinion, men like W.E.B. DuBois, A. Phillip Randolph, and Marcus Garvey, foreshadowed the civil rights leadership of the future. He noted, however, that an all black movement, like that of Garvey's, could not succeed without some white support.

The goal of Myrdal's work would be the successful integration of blacks into the mainstream of American society. He believed that the problems of black life, low education, high crime rates, and drug addiction, for example, would eventually decline. These traits were not innate cultural attributes, as many whites believed, but often commonly accepted stereotypes. Many blacks even began to believe in these stereotypes as an integral part of their social existence.

The civil rights struggle of the 1950's and 1960's appeared to support Myrdal's claims of 1944. He foreshadowed the modern civil rights movement. The influence of this study on future events extended into both American life and politics. One reviewer wrote that the work influenced "high public officials -- including U.S. Senators, Presidents, and Justices of the Supreme Court-- and to other men of practical affairs."<sup>4</sup>

The review and interpretations of Myrdal's study varied greatly. Some reviewers unfavorably criticized Myrdal's basic thesis. Others praised the work as an effective tool in the civil rights movements. Some white southerners who read the work noted that it could upset the racial status quo in their area, and denounced it without exception. These whites understood the problem of having to accomodate a large segment of black poor in their region, but knew that giving blacks more political and social power created changes which they could not support.

One reviewer wrote that, "A small group of Negro agitators and another small group of white rabble-rousers are pushing this country closer and closer to an interracial explosion which may make the race riots of the first World War seem mild by comparison."<sup>5</sup> This reviewer believed that the work was excessively critical of the South. One sociologist attacked the work for its "unfounded optimism" and claimed that it threw "the whole Negro problem, with the American creed, back into the lap of politics."<sup>6</sup>

Blacks took a much more positive view of An American Dilemma. DuBois praised the work for its analysis of the race problem within American civilization. DuBois pointed out that Myrdal viewed the question of race as a moral problem, unlike other historians and sociologists who perceived the dilemma as an economic development. DuBois accepted Myrdal's premise completely. One black reviewer claimed that "no scholar, writer, or serious teacher should have the audacity to discuss the Negro in American without consulting Myrdal's volumes."<sup>7</sup> Many of these reviewers believed that the importance of the work for the future would be a shift in strategy for the civil rights movement from the defensive to the offensive.

An eminent black historian, Carter G. Woodson, compared Myrdal's work with the memorandum which Ralph Bunche produced. He believed that Bunche took a less idealistic view than had Myrdal. Woodson was skeptical about the

impact of such a large-scale work. World War Two contributed to much of this skepticism. As blacks fought overseas against racism, they also fought racism at home. Other historians criticized Myrdal for his lack of historical perspective. The work's basis, however, appeared as a sociological interpretation, not a historical one.

As predicted An American Dilemma had considerable impact on politics in postwar America. The Truman Administration's civil rights moves were sometimes traced to the work, at least for some clarification of the existing problems. It had been noted that Truman owned a copy of the work and occasionally read from it. In 1947, reports appeared from the Civil Rights Committee and the Committee on Higher Education. Truman had used executive orders to create both organizations. In 1948, Truman issued an executive order calling for racial equality of treatment for blacks in the armed services.

An American Dilemma, like other lengthy studies, was condensed for more readability and usage. In 1948, Arnold Rose's abridgement appeared. This work gave more Americans access to Myrdal's view. By the late 1940's not only had the scholars and politicians read the book, but much of the general public also.

Truman's Civil Rights Committee, which included many blacks, responded to racial tensions in the postwar period. The President claimed that he created it with a feeling of urgency because now that the war was over, "racial and



religious intolerance began to appear and threaten the very things we had fought for." <sup>8</sup> The committee called for the elimination of segregation and discrimination and asked for a federal grant system to provide blacks with aid. In its report on racial problems, the committee had used An American Dilemma in its research. Thus, the work's emphasis on political civil rights activity was apparent. In fact, Myrdal had visited Truman and both men agreed that major civil rights reforms were necessary. An American Dilemma played a major role in changing white attitudes about civil rights.

One critic of Myrdal's, James Q. Wilson, noted that An American Dilemma may have correctly described the cause of the race problem, but it did nothing to solve current racial tensions. He stated that "most thoughtful Negroes in the North long ago rejected the notion that the white man will gradually concede to them the rights they demand without effort on their part. A need is seen for vigorous action to aid in the realization of these goals." <sup>9</sup> Wilson's statements came in 1960 during the period when the civil rights movement had just begun to evolve.

Myrdal's work undoubtedly had an impact on the struggle for civil rights in the 1960's. After the twentieth anniversary edition of An American Dilemma appeared in 1965, reviewers again debated the value of the work. Harvard historian, Oscar Handlin, noted that the

usefulness of Myrdal's study had increased since 1954, but that the future must prove its true value.

During the postwar period political developments had created new problems for the Republicans. The loss of black votes from the party after 1948 occurred because of the view among many blacks that the GOP had very little sympathy for their economic and social problems. One black voter stated that "if I'm gonna get unemployed, I'd rather the Democrats be in."<sup>10</sup> This unpopularity for Republican candidates continued through 1960. Blacks had become educated about the significance of the two-party system and began to shift heavily toward the Democratic party.

In 1948 President Truman fought to institute civil rights laws before the Republicans could take all the credit for such action. However, a new Selective Service Act was passed without a ban on segregation in the armed forces. During the Democratic convention in July, the Democrats fought to include four civil rights proposals supported by Truman in the party platform. The planks passed by a small margin. They provided for the following: equal treatment in the armed services, abolition of all poll taxes, anti-lynching laws, and legislation for fair employment practices.

Southern Democrats at the convention attempted to add a states' rights clause to these civil rights planks, but they were overwhelmingly defeated. The Mississippi and Alabama delegations walked out of the convention and

formed the Dixiecrat party over the states' rights issue. The Democratic Party lost Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina in the election of 1948, but Truman won anyway.

Truman in his acceptance speech stated that Congress would be called back into session to deal with civil rights issues. After the convention the President then issued Executive Orders 9980 and 9981 which integrated the armed forces. By this fast action he demonstrated that he could accomplish civil rights reform when the Republicans could not. In the 1948 Republican platform, planks against lynchings, poll taxes, and segregation were added. The Republican nominee, Thomas E. Dewey, from New York, said nothing about civil rights in the campaign.

Truman created an advisory committee on civil rights, a Fair Employment Practices Commission, and a Government Compliance Committee which dealt with discrimination in government jobs. He successfully integrated the armed forces against overwhelming opposition. The end of his presidency closed a major era in the history of black civil rights. Civil rights became an important political issue from this point on. Blacks would find themselves in a transition stage where equality had not been completely gained. Civil rights progressed slowly, yet improvements did follow.

Civil rights became a national issue for the first time in the 1950's. President Dwight D. Eisenhower attempted to pursue and recapture the black for the Republican party. Some blacks switched over to Eisenhower in the 1952 election because of the perception that the Democrat challenger, Adlai Stevenson, had attempted to form a "southern coalition." Stevenson's running mate, John J. Sparkman, (D-Ala), was not a civil rights advocate. Blacks viewed such a coalition, which held a widely different view of the racial problem, as a drawback to civil rights reform. The Democratic platform stated that a strong central government could help solve the problems of society, but it gave few examples of any special programs or ideas. The states' rights philosophy in the Democratic party was still strong. The Republican platform, although adhering to a strong belief in states' rights, included a clause condemning racial prejudice.

Civil rights issues did not have a great effect on the outcome of the 1952 election, but a portion of the southern vote shifted toward Eisenhower. He campaigned more in the South than any previous Republican candidate. His presence there broke the old standard that "to many citizens of the South, a Republican is a curiosity."<sup>11</sup>

Southerners voted for the Republicans as an attack against old Democratic policies. Yet low-income voters and blacks remained fairly loyal to the Democratic party. Adlai Stevenson received 73 per cent of the black vote in

the 1952 election.<sup>12</sup> Most blacks since 1934 perceived any Republican victory as a damaging loss for civil rights. The political environment caused a negative view of the party which had given blacks their freedom. Even with black support for Stevenson at 73%, Democratic black votes appeared to be suprisingly low.

Eisenhower's stand on civil rights displayed a sincere belief in a hope for equal and integrated conditions for blacks. He insisted "that a Negro can improve his social standing and his respect for certain of the standards that we whites observe, as well as we can... and I believe he is entitled to the chance to show his own wares."<sup>13</sup>

Eisenhower accomplished no civil rights legislation, however, in his first two years of office. He felt that the Democratic Congress caused this lack of legislation by preventing civil rights issues from reaching the floor. Eisenhower also believed that other legislative issues could be adversely affected if pressure was exerted for civil rights measures.

The Republicans in Congress failed to create any successful reform with the exception of Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois, who sought to strengthen civil rights laws. Eisenhower took a different view of civil rights action. He believed that any reform should be low-key, and that successes in civil rights must not be heavily publicized. The administration's policy was to play down any significant accomplishments.

Eisenhower's limited civil rights action resulted from his theories on the central government. He believed that the federal government "should act only when the states show their inability of their refusal to grapple with the question."<sup>14</sup> He applied the theory of a weak central government to civil rights. This philosophy limited the power of the president to use force. Eisenhower based his political ideology on his view of the Constitution. The role that had been played by Republican presidents in the civil rights picture have often been affected by their strict or narrow interpretation of the Constitution.

Eisenhower's policies on civil rights became more clear by the third year of his presidency. He completed the task of desegregation in the armed forces. Eisenhower established the Committee on Government Employment Policy to look into reports of discrimination. He appointed blacks to administration posts and hired over 6,000 blacks as federal employees.<sup>15</sup> Eisenhower sought to eliminate the second-class citizenship status of blacks. Many blacks were employed in white collar jobs for the first time in the Federal Reserve System, public utility companies, and in such private institutes as petroleum and aircraft. Eisenhower's integration policies proved effective in many areas. He openly endorsed the landmark 1954 court decision on school desegregation (Brown vs. Board of Education).

Eisenhower had little difficulty in defeating Stevenson for a second time in 1956. He received 18 per cent more of the black vote than he did in the 1952 election. The Democrats still received 61 percent of the black vote.<sup>16</sup> When noting the small percentage of black support for the Republican party, Eisenhower reportedly remarked, "What does it take to get these people to support you?"<sup>17</sup> There was some speculation that the Republican party might have liberalized its policy on civil rights had a greater shift of black voters occurred. The small gain in black votes for the Republican party can be traced to his presidential endorsement for the 1954 court decision on desegregation, but his success in votes failed to carry over to other Republicans candidates. Only five new southern Republican Congressmen entered the House of Representatives during the 1950's.

Attorney General Herbert Brownell tried to build black support for the Republican party. He had seen Governor Thomas Dewey go down to defeat in 1948 by failing to win the black vote in the northern cities. Brownell became instrumental in enacting the 1957 Civil Rights Bill. A watered down version of the bill finally passed against the wishes of southern Democrats, who presented the only opposition.

The Civil Rights Act placed an Assistant Attorney General in authority to gain civil rights relief. This move protected individual voting rights. Under

Eisenhower's administration the creation of the Commission on Civil Rights came from the 1957 Civil Rights Act. This permitted another Assistant Attorney General in the Justice Department to work in a Civil Rights Division. The Attorney General also gained greater power to protect voting rights by bringing law suits against offenders. This act became the first major civil rights breakthrough since Reconstruction, however, Attorney General William Rogers, who succeeded Brownell, never brought any cases before the court under Eisenhower's administration.

In 1960 another Civil Rights Act passed Congress which gave the Attorney General further powers to protect black voting rights. The 1960 act allowed federal courts to review individual cases to find voting discrimination patterns and practices. This act cleared up many of the inadequacies from the 1957 act, yet it also had limitations as a compromise agreement.

Eisenhower's chief civil rights advisor, Maxwell Rabb, found reform difficult because of the conservative Republican administration. Not until Eisenhower's second term did the President meet with civil rights leaders. Rabb criticized this lack of discussion over civil rights problems. Eisenhower's philosophy of politics limited his action. His view of government "called for a wall of separation between its main organs so that one branch would not impose itself on another."<sup>18</sup> Eisenhower ignored most



of the civil rights actions which took place during his administration. He had no part in implementing the Brown vs. the Board of Education decision. He also showed his unwillingness to send federal troops and aid to Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957, until mob violence prevented black students from attending the high school. He approved the Civil Rights Bills of 1957 and 1960, but he did not have a hand in their creation. Eisenhower reduced civil rights actions, such as the creation of a Civil Rights Division, to merely discussion on groups and advisory boards. This met with criticism from liberal Republicans, such as Senator Jacob Javits, (R.-New York).

In 1960 the civil rights issue again entered national politics. The boycotts and demonstrations directed against local racial norms and laws influenced the presidential election. Although John F. Kennedy became president after winning 71% of the black vote, Richard Nixon gained more votes from southern whites.<sup>19</sup> The black voter, however, made the difference. Kennedy openly courted the black vote by emphasizing that the president's responsibility was to "provide a 'moral tone and moral leadership' in the field of civil rights."<sup>20</sup> Nixon and the Republicans had hoped that the black voter would notice their own civil rights record. The Republican party platform considered civil rights a national issue and called for the elimination of discrimination.

Only days before the election the publicized telephone call to Martin Luther King demonstrated the Kennedys' concern for the civil rights movement. In 1961 Attorney General Robert Kennedy sent U.S. Marshalls to Montgomery, Alabama, to stop rioting over segregation laws. President Kennedy dispatched 3,000 troops to the University of Mississippi to restore order after James Meredith became the first black to enroll there in 1962. He also used the National Guard to insure enforcement of integration in other southern states. Kennedy requested sweeping civil rights legislation to go along with this enforcement action.

In reality, Kennedy limited much of his legislation. The delayed executive order on housing and its narrow scope indicated that he had a reluctance to fully commit himself. In contrast with Eisenhower, however, his actions stood out. After Kennedy's death, Lyndon Johnson, his successor, became an open advocate of civil rights measures.

The 1964 presidential election presented the voters with a definite choice. In the Republican party the nomination of Barry Goldwater found its political base in the seizure of Republican machinery by a right-wing conservative movement. These new Republicans ousted many moderates from the governing circles of the party. Goldwater became stamped as "the segregationist candidate" because of his political philosophy. On states' rights constitutional principles, he had voted against the 1964

Civil Rights Act. In the election, Goldwater carried only one area of political strength, the "Dixiecrat belt," because of his association with segregation.

A prominent southern Democrat, Senator J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, moved to what he called the "Goldwater Republican Party."<sup>21</sup> Most voters believed Goldwater to be an extremist, and he won very little support across the country. The Republicans had successful years in 1964 and 1966 anyway. In 1964, the party gained five new southern Congressional seats and in 1966 they added four more. One of the failures of the Goldwater campaign resulted from the black perception of the GOP as a racist party which used the issue as a "southern strategy" to lure votes from southern whites.<sup>22</sup>

The presidency of Lyndon Johnson resulted in the implementation of civil rights measures which greatly helped blacks. He signed the Civil Rights Bill of 1964, which opened all public areas for blacks. Congress outlawed poll taxes with the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, and a new voting rights law guaranteed the right of blacks to vote. Literacy tests also became illegal. The Civil Rights Act of 1968 ended racial discrimination in public housing. The Republicans had done little to contribute to the formation of these reforms.

In the 1968 presidential election blacks supported Robert D. Kennedy before his assassination. The defection of Governor George Wallace of Alabama, however, severely

weakened the Democratic party. His candidacy on a third party ticket symbolized a reaction against the emerging strength of the southern black voters. Wallace gained 46 electoral votes and 9 million popular votes from southern states. Blacks did not, however, switch over and vote for the Republican candidate, Richard M. Nixon. In the election 88 per cent of the blacks voted for the Democratic candidate Hubert Humphrey. Against this background of black distrust, Nixon asked that Americans judge him by his actions. He stated that "I know all the words. I know all the gimmicks and the phrases that would win the applause of black audiences and the profession civil rights leaders. I am not going to use them. I am interested in deeds."<sup>23</sup>

Nixon had met with Senator Strom Thurmond and others in the spring of 1968 to promise that if he became president, he would relax federal school desegregation pressure. This commitment gained southern support for him in the election. The Nixon victory brought this "southern strategy" into action. Many of those who fought for desegregation in the South demonstrated their anger for the Nixon Administration policy. The Atlanta Constitution printed many of these arguments. One writer stated that "I feel very strongly that the Nixon Administration is one of our real problems. There are two things, the Nixon Administration's failure to take a stand and say what they mean, and the inconsistencies in enforcing the law... these two

things have had a terrific impact."<sup>24</sup> To counter these attacks, Nixon officials stated that he sought to integrate schools "without seriously endangering the quality of education."<sup>25</sup>

Nixon appointed sixteen blacks to federal judgeships. Seven blacks became Flag Officers and one received the rank of Admiral. Nixon placed 88 blacks on federal advisory boards and commissions within the first three years of his administration. Several blacks also served on the White House staff. In the area of employment, Nixon's programs brought about an increase in opportunities for blacks. One project, the Philadelphia Plan, increased participation for minorities as high as 13 percent on federal projects; it also gave blacks 28,000 new jobs. The number of new employees in manpower programs rose to over one million. Summer jobs and youth training became more available to minorities. The federal civilian work force was made up of 19.5 per cent minority employees. Nixon increased the budget, and hence the effectiveness, of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. New funding was estimated to create 300,000 additional minority jobs by 1973.

Changes also occurred in the field of education. Segregation in public schools in the South decreased from 68 per cent to only 9 per cent by 1972. Schools involved in desegregation cases found funds in a 150 million dollar pool. Nixon set aside funds for upgrading the educational quality of disadvantaged schools in the country. He

allocated 200 million dollars to colleges in 1973 to facilities."<sup>26</sup>

Housing practices also became involved in reform. A 10.9 million dollar fund assisted Fair Housing Programs. Courts filed over 100 law suits against housing discrimination. Subsidized housing increased greatly under the Nixon Administration. One proposal attempted to create rents which would vary according to income. Banking institutions received federal help in business areas. The Minority Bank Deposit Program netted 100 million dollars in investments. This organization represented "the largest single transfer of economic power into black controlled economic institutions in the history of the country."<sup>27</sup> The Office of Minority Business became established in 1969. It gave 64 million dollars in funds to increase loans and guarantees for black businessmen. This figure increased to 415 million dollars by 1973. Through this program, a special group of organizations developed into the Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment Companies.<sup>28</sup>

The Nixon Administration used court litigation as a method of forcing civil rights law compliance. Nixon wanted the states to deal with the issue, rather than the central government. He believed that the responsibility for enforcement should not come from the federal government. Nixon agreed with Eisenhower that "people had to see the light themselves."<sup>29</sup> Those who hoped to

prevent implementation of new civil rights legislation often found success. The strength of combined forces for civil rights had a great effect, but this group rarely became sufficiently organized enough to bring about major legislation. No strength could be found to stop the southern bloc from countering new laws by taking advantages of loopholes.

Even after useful legislative programs, the black man "was no longer as Republican as he was a hundred years ago."<sup>30</sup> Until 1974, the only prominent black Republican national office holder was Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts. Black Republicans held only eight of the 144 House Republican seats. A few high level black appointees had been quietly named to Nixon's staff, with little publicity.

In the 1972 election, 90 percent of blacks voted for Senator George McGovern of South Dakota. This election demonstrated the lack of effectiveness that blacks have in landslide elections. McGovern represented an opportunity for new civil rights reform for many blacks. The easy victory for Nixon in the election, wrote Charles Hamilton, "should raise the question of the value of black voter participation ... in Presidential electoral politics."<sup>31</sup> The lack of black voter effectiveness is compounded by a decline in black voter participation since 1964. Time Magazine assessed Nixon's attitude toward black voters by stating that "Nixon shows little evident interest in

America's serious continuing challenge: race relations. He felt no political obligations to blacks, who again voted overwhelmingly Democratic."<sup>32</sup> Federal aid for black businesses and colleges totaled 150 million dollars, but Nixon pumped 1.5 billion dollars into law enforcement for his policy of "law and order." Nixon failed to support civil rights programs such as busing and affirmative action.<sup>33</sup> Charles Hamilton, author of The Black Experience in American Politics, stated "Mr. Nixon seems to say in code that there is no reason for whites to feel guilty about these things; one ought to feel proud."<sup>34</sup>

Blacks did not get what they wanted in the Nixon Administration. In an article by Hubert Humphrey on the plight of blacks in the Nixon Administration, he stated that little had improved in the racial conditions of America since the abolition of slavery. Federal leadership proved effective in reform, but the Nixon Administration failed in that regard. In many ways, the Nixon measures were sadly diluted. A prominent Republican, William McCulloch of Ohio, stated that "the Administration creates a remedy for which there is no wrong on the record and leaves grievous wrongs without adequate remedy."<sup>35</sup> The voting bill that Nixon supported gave the central government the burden of proof to declare voting laws discriminatory, but the state governments did not need to show that the laws were not discriminatory. Humphrey criticized Nixon's programs which gave blacks investment capital,



believing that very few loans actually came through, and no program showed success.

President Gerald Ford's policies appeared to differ little from Nixon's. Jimmy Carter's Administration, however, made numerous top-level black appointments. The Republican party in the 1970s did not move from its position at the turn of the century. The organization had won little if any black support.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

The Emancipation Proclamation assured black allegiance to the Republican Party. This allegiance lasted until the onset of the New Deal. The Democrats then became responsible for civil rights reform. The Eisenhower administration presented much useful legislation, yet the Democrats replaced it in 1960. The Republicans failed to satisfy the black voter for the next twenty years. The party that began with such good intentions had nearly become a white political organization. Republicans were not generally racist, but their ideology made it difficult for blacks to lend their support. This has forced black voters into narrow choices today. "One-party" politics has become their only option.

The problem of blacks and politics can not be called a new development. The struggle for enfranchisement and the issue of racial equality both became very controversial. The effect of more than 300 years of slavery made the fight for civil rights a slow one. Change came very slowly.

This change began in America before the Civil War. Blacks supported the early Republican Party, yet they felt cautious. They raised several questions about the party's anti-slavery status. One black abolitionist spoke for many blacks when he stated that "we do not pledge ourselves to go further with the Republicans than the Republicans will go with us."<sup>1</sup> The party verified its stand by proposing

new legislation for the institution of complete suffrage to all males, with no color restriction. This continued effort brought new black interest to the Republican party.

In many ways blacks have undergone a difficult socialization process, which has led them to believe that the American political system would not support them in their struggle for equality. This belief has alienated some blacks from the existing political system enough to create militant attitudes, indeed, "if Negroes had assimilated the American dream and seriously wanted it for themselves, it is hard to believe they would not long since have been radically disenchanted and militantly alienated."<sup>2</sup>

High level political appointments often held the black vote in one party or the other. The allegiance of blacks to the Republican party continued from Reconstruction to the New Deal. Full scale organization of blacks on the part of Democrats changed black loyalties.

The positive attributes of Reconstruction had given way to despondency with the "nadir" through the turn of the century. The dilemma which affected black Americans reflected the actions of the Republican party. Although the party did not cause these poor conditions, it must accept responsibility for inaction in creating better civil rights. The Republican presidents must accept the greatest burden of the blame for failure to understand the problems of black Americans. The party had demonstrated that black votes were not necessary to maintain Republicans in

national office, but it was that same party which had the greatest opportunities to further the cause of civil rights.

World War I brought some reform but disillusionment increased greatly afterwards. The attachment of blacks to the Republican party weakened due to the struggles of the Lily-Whites in the 1920's. World War II also appeared to bring new hope for the future of civil rights. The Republican party, however, had little to do with any major civil rights reform during this time. The post-war era furthered black dissatisfaction with the Republican party.

In the 1950's the Republicans showed an inability to take advantage of the Eisenhower Administration's record on civil rights. The Democrats took the initiative in the Kennedy years, and they have never lost it. Over the years the Republican Party has brought about broadly based political benefits for blacks, but, "since blacks were first enfranchised, both parties have, during the course of history, adopted policies that led either directly or indirectly to black disenfranchisement... [however]... it was the Republicans who the Negro once considered his 'friend', today the Democrats are afforded that designation."<sup>3</sup>

The problem of blacks in politics has proved to be a very complex issue. Black votes have only been effective when they were used as the balance of power to swing elections. The support for black issues and civil rights

is in jeopardy if the black minority fails to get political support from either party. The attitudes of the Republican Party today make it difficult to produce a major shift toward the party in the near future. Republican attitudes likewise, will not change because Republican officeholders have such a small black constituency.

FOOTNOTES

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<sup>2</sup>Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 265

<sup>3</sup>Johnson, p. 12

<sup>4</sup>Foner, p. 229

<sup>5</sup>John and LaWanda Cox, Reconstruction the Negro and the New South, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1973), p. 89

<sup>6</sup>Cox, p. 105

<sup>7</sup>Hanes Walton, Black Politics: A Theoretical and Structural Analysis, (New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1922), p. 87

<sup>8</sup>Walton, p. 87

<sup>9</sup>Cox, p. 122

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<sup>11</sup>Peter Camejo, Racism, Revolution, Reaction, 1861-1877: The Rise and Fall of Radical Reconstruction, (New York: Momad Press, 1976), p. 176

<sup>12</sup>Stanley Hirshson, Farewell to the Bloody Shirt: Northern Republicans and the Southern Negroes, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962), p. 26.

<sup>13</sup>Woodward, p. 15

<sup>14</sup>Hirshson, p. 39

<sup>15</sup>Hirshson, pp. 24-25

<sup>16</sup>Rayford W. Logan, The Betrayal of the Negro: From Rutherford B. Hayes to Woodrow Wilson, (London Collier Books, 1969), p. 37

FOOTNOTES (Chapter I Continued)

<sup>17</sup>Logan, p. 47

<sup>18</sup>Hirshson, p. 48

<sup>19</sup>Hirshson, p. 49

<sup>20</sup>Woodward, p. 15

<sup>21</sup>Woodward, p. 36

<sup>22</sup>Camejo, p. 82

<sup>23</sup>Vincent DeSantis, "The Republican Party and the Southern Negro, 1877-1897," The Journal of Negro History, 45 (April 1960): 79.

<sup>24</sup>DeSantis, p. 79

<sup>25</sup>Merline Pitre, "Frederick Douglass; A Party Loyalist, 1870-1895," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1981), p. 2

<sup>26</sup>Pitre, pp. 233-234

<sup>27</sup>Pitre, p. 80

<sup>28</sup>Pitre, p. 81

<sup>29</sup>Pitre, p. 84

<sup>30</sup>Pitre, p. 101

<sup>31</sup>Pitre, p. 125

<sup>32</sup>Pitre, p. 128

<sup>33</sup>Pitre, p. 135

<sup>34</sup>Pitre, p. 178

<sup>35</sup>Walton, Black Republicans, p. 35

<sup>36</sup>Walton, p. 36

<sup>37</sup>Walton, p. 37

<sup>38</sup>Walton, p. 38

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<sup>1</sup>Rayford W. Logan, The Betrayal of the Negro: From Rutherford B. Hayes, to Woodrow Wilson (London: Collier Books, 1969), p. 50

<sup>2</sup>Logan, p. 50

<sup>3</sup>Logan, p. 51

<sup>4</sup>Logan, p. 52

<sup>5</sup>Logan, p. 53

<sup>6</sup>Logan, p. 56

<sup>7</sup>Logan, p. 57

<sup>8</sup>Richard B. Sherman, The Republican Party and Black America: From McKinley to Hoover - 1896-1933, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1973), p. 2

<sup>9</sup>Hanes Walton, Jr. Black Republican The Politics of the Blacks and Tans, (Metuchen) N.J.: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1975), p. 40

<sup>10</sup>Sherman, p. 7

<sup>11</sup>Sherman, p. 13

<sup>12</sup>Sherman, p. 14

<sup>13</sup>Sherman, p. 14

<sup>14</sup>Sherman, p. 18

<sup>15</sup>Sherman, p. 21

<sup>16</sup>Herbert Aptheker, ed., A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United States, (New York: Citadel Press, 1951), p. 787

<sup>17</sup>Kenneth G. Goode, From Africa to the United States and Then ..., Second Ed., (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1976) p. 99

<sup>18</sup>Sherman, p. 27

<sup>19</sup>Sherman, p. 34

<sup>20</sup>Sherman, p. 43



FOOTNOTES (Chapter II - Continued)

<sup>20</sup>Sherman, p. 45

<sup>21</sup>Sherman, p. 49

<sup>22</sup>Sherman, p. 65

<sup>23</sup>Sherman, p. 72.

<sup>24</sup>Sherman, p. 78

<sup>25</sup>Walton, Black Republicans, p. 153

<sup>26</sup>Walton, Black Republicans, pp. 154-155

<sup>27</sup>Walton, Black Republicans, p. 155

<sup>28</sup>Logan, p. 360

<sup>29</sup>Paul D. Casdorph, Republicans, Negroes, and Progressives in the South, 1912-1916, (University of Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1981) p. 1

<sup>30</sup>Goode, p. 115

<sup>31</sup>Goode, p. 116

<sup>32</sup>Goode, p. 119

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<sup>2</sup>Richard B. Sherman, The Republican Party and Black American from Mckinley to Hoover, 1896-1933, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1973), p. 144

<sup>3</sup>Sherman, p. 164

<sup>4</sup>Sherman, p. 209

<sup>5</sup>Sherman, p. 218

<sup>6</sup>Sherman, p. 224

<sup>7</sup>Sherman, pp. 224

<sup>8</sup>Walton, Black Republicans, p. 161

<sup>9</sup>Walton, Black Republicans, p. 163

<sup>10</sup>Sherman, p. 232

<sup>11</sup>Sherman, p. 235

<sup>12</sup>Sherman, p. 251

<sup>13</sup>Nancy Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 15

<sup>14</sup>Weiss, p. 21

<sup>15</sup>Weiss, p. 26

<sup>16</sup>Weiss, p. 33

<sup>17</sup>Kenneth G. Goode, From Africa to the United States and Then ..., (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1976), p. 124.

<sup>18</sup>Weiss, p. 206

<sup>19</sup>Weiss, p. xvi

<sup>20</sup>Weiss, p. 219

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<sup>1</sup>Kenneth G. Goode, From Africa to the United States and Then ..., Second Ed. (Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman, and Company, 1976), p. 137.

<sup>2</sup>Ralph Bunche, The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 35

<sup>3</sup>Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1944), p. xlvii

<sup>4</sup>D.W.Southern, An American Dilemma Revisited: Myrdal's Study through a Quarter Century, Unpublished Thesis, (Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Micro-films, 1971) p. iii

<sup>5</sup>Virginia Dabney, "Nearer and Nearer the Precipice," Atlantic Monthly, LXXI (Jan 1943), p. 94

<sup>6</sup>Southern, An American Dilemma Revisited, p. 62

<sup>7</sup>Ibid, p. 70

<sup>8</sup>Ibid, p. 119

<sup>9</sup>James O. Wilson, Negro Politics: The Search for Leadership, (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960) p. 7

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<sup>11</sup>George B. Tindall, The Disruption of the Solid South, (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1972), p. 47

<sup>12</sup>Steven F. Lawson, Black Ballots; Voting Rights in the South, 1944-1969, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 141

<sup>13</sup>Ibid, 141

<sup>14</sup>Ibid, p. 144

<sup>15</sup>Robert P. Turner, Up to the Front Line; Blacks in the American Political System, Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1975), p. 125.

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<sup>14</sup>Chuck Stone, Black Political Power in America, (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1970). p. 55

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 55

<sup>18</sup>Allan Wolk, The Presidency and Black Civil Rights: Eisenhower to Nixon, (Cranbury, N.J. : Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1971), p. 240

<sup>19</sup>Lawson, p. 141

<sup>20</sup>Turner, p. 169

<sup>21</sup>Tindall, p. 64

<sup>22</sup>Turner, p. 126

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 127

<sup>24</sup>Reg Murphy and Hal Gulliver, The Southern Strategy, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971) p. 69

<sup>25</sup>Lee W. Huebner, "Nixon and the Blacks," The Black Republican, (Fall 1969), p. 6

<sup>26</sup>Turner, pp. 127-9

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 129

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 128

<sup>29</sup>Wolk, p. 247

<sup>30</sup>Turner, p. 129

<sup>31</sup>Charles V. Hamilton, ed., The Black Experience in American Politics, (New York: Capricorn Books 1973), p. 357

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 343

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 344

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 347

<sup>35</sup>Hubert H. Humphrey, "Nixon and the Blacks: A Different View," The Black Politician (Winter 1970), p. 4

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<sup>1</sup>R. Johnson, The National Formulation of the Republican Party, 1854-1856, (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1971) p. 12

<sup>2</sup>Hanes Walton, Jr. Black Republicans: The Politics of the Black and Tans, (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1975), p. 161

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 163

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